With the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical) replaced the U.S.-Soviet nuclear standoff as the dominant U.S. security concern. Chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation and the potential use of these weapons by terrorists deserve particular attention, as CBW capabilities have been confirmed or suspected in some 20 nations. The anthrax mailings to journalists and members of Congress in 2001 drove home the reality of the bioterrorist threat to U.S. citizens, though evidence of global CBW threats had been mounting for several years. Revelations about the size and sophistication of Iraq's CBW programs in the summer of 1995 provided a disturbing reminder of how advanced such programs can become while avoiding international attention. Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and Aum Shinrikyo's use of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995 suggest that inhibitions on CBW use are not as strong as one might like.

CISAC scholars examine emerging biotechnologies that could be used to cause catastrophic harm, and how to respond to such threats. Working with colleagues at Stanford and other institutions, CISAC researchers are thinking through related public policy issues such as the best ways to strengthen public health surveillance and emergency response, the utility and drawbacks of oversight of research or research publication, and the advantages and dangers of classified biodefense work.

To help clarify our understanding of emerging chemical and biological threats, CISAC addresses the following aspects of these weapons' development and use: production methods for different CBW agents, the effects of CBW agents in humans, different means for dispersing CBW agents (especially in the atmosphere), CBW agent detection, and finally, means for protecting humans (e.g., immunization, evacuation, protective masks and clothing, among others). These technical issues must be addressed in some detail if policymakers are to develop effective responses for limiting the spread of CBW through arms control, deterring their use if they spread, and protecting military forces and civilian populations if deterrence fails.

Contact
Dean Wilkening